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dc.contributor.authorBrollo, Fernandaen
dc.contributor.authorNannicini, Tommasoen
dc.contributor.authorPerotti, Robertoen
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:02:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:02:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35858-
dc.description.abstractThe paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4706en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH40en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGovernment spendingen
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical selectionen
dc.subject.stwKommunalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwBrasilienen
dc.titleThe political resource curse-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn619848839en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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