Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35822 
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dc.contributor.authorvon Siemens, Ferdinanden
dc.contributor.authorKosfeld, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-07-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:58:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:58:51Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090513220en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35822-
dc.description.abstractRothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the respective principal - can solve the equilibrium existence problem, even when the size of the externalities is arbitrarily small. Our result highlights the degree of control a principal has over the attractiveness of his contracts as an important feature for equilibrium existence, thereby offering a new perspective on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4125en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordexternalityen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleNegative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn599383712en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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