Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35813
Authors: 
Hall, Robert E.
Krueger, Alan B.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3775
Abstract: 
Some workers bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job. Others could bargain, but find it undesirable, because their right to bargain has induced a sufficiently favorable offer, which they accept. Yet others perceive that they cannot bargain over pay; they regard the posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity. Theories of wage formation point to substantial differences in labor-market equilibrium between bargained and posted wages. The fraction of workers hired away from existing jobs is another key determinant of equilibrium, because a worker with an existing job has a better outside option in bargaining than does an unemployed worker. Our survey measures the incidences of wage posting, bargaining, and on-the-job search. We find that about a third of workers had precise information about pay when they first met with their employers, a sign of wage posting. We find that another third bargained over pay before accepting their current jobs. And about 40 percent of workers could have remained on their earlier jobs at the time they accepted their current jobs.
Subjects: 
Jobs
wages
bargaining
equilibrium
JEL: 
E24
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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