Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35802
Authors: 
Ferrall, Christopher
Salvanes, Kjell G.
Sørensen, Erik Ø.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 4130
Abstract: 
We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined through multilateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of linearly separable production.
Subjects: 
Wage distributions
productivity
matched data
multilateral bargaining
assignment models
JEL: 
D2
J3
J24
L25
J7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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