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dc.contributor.authorKosfeld, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorvon Siemens, Ferdinanden
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:58:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:58:20Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081217231en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35779-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms persist because cooperation strictly increases output and worker separation requires firms employing cooperative workers to pay out weakly lower wages.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3881en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTeam worken
dc.subject.keywordself-selectionen
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwGewinnen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWorker self-selection and the profits from cooperation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn588007218en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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