Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35776
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dc.contributor.authorGalasso, Vincenzoen_US
dc.contributor.authorNannicini, Tommasoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:58:18Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:58:18Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009082147en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35776-
dc.description.abstractIs electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a theoretical model in which ideological parties select candidates between party loyalists and experts, and allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters, who care about national and local policies, strongly prefer experts. We show that parties compete on good politicians by allocating them to the most contestable districts. Empirical evidence on Italian members of parliament confirms this prediction. We find that politicians with higher ex-ante quality - as measured by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government experience - are more likely to run in a contestable district. Indeed, despite being different on average, the characteristics of politicians belonging to opposite parties converge to high-quality levels in close races. Furthermore, politicians elected in contestable districts make fewer absences in parliament; this is shown to be driven more by a selection effect than by reelection incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4282en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprobabilistic votingen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleCompeting on good politiciansen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608071714en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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