Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35721 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4112
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent if groups perform at the same level and it therefore does not eliminate low-cooperation equilibria. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if incentives to compete are strong.
Subjects: 
Intergroup competition
cooperation
public goods
experiment
JEL: 
H41
M52
C92
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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