Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35713 
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dc.contributor.authorApps, Patriciaen
dc.contributor.authorRees, Rayen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:55:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:55:39Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090612132en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35713-
dc.description.abstractThis paper applies the theory of relational contracts to make precise the idea that because households are engaged in a repeated non-cooperative game, Pareto efficient outcomes can be supported by self interest, given the specific pattern of specialisation and exchange which exists in the household. The household's choice of a particular solution from the resulting feasible set is found by the maximisation of a household welfare function, a generalisation of a suggestion originally made by Samuelson. This nests as special cases the objective functions used in currently popular models of households engaged in one-shot cooperative games. We take a specific example of such a household welfare function, characterise the determinants of the household utility distribution, and then apply the model to examine the effects of a move from joint to individual taxation. We show that on standard stylised facts, secondary earners are always better off absolutely, and define the conditions under which they will also be so relatively. This confirms the conclusions from models which concern themselves only with the across-household welfare distribution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4189en
dc.subject.jelD11en
dc.subject.jelD13en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH24en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.jelJ12en
dc.subject.jelJ16en
dc.subject.jelK36en
dc.subject.jelN30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRelational contractsen
dc.subject.keywordhouseholdsen
dc.subject.keywordallocationsen
dc.subject.keywordtaxationen
dc.subject.keywordwelfare distributionen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwSteueren
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwFamilienbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRelational contracts, taxation and the household-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn602120101en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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