Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35691
Authors: 
Addison, John T.
Schnabel, Claus
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3918
Abstract: 
Despite its lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity codetermination at company level has held up remarkably well. We recount the theoretical arguments for and against codetermination and survey the empirical evidence on the effects of the institution, tracing the three phases of a still sparse literature. Recent findings hold out the prospect that good corporate governance might include employee representation by virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency costs, while yet cautioning that the optimal level of representation is likely below parity. And although the German system may be better than its reputation among foreigners, it might have to adapt to globalization and the availability of alternative forms of corporate governance in the EU.
Subjects: 
Codetermination
board-level employee representation
firm performance
Germany
JEL: 
J50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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