Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35672 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-28-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:55:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:55:09Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081127685en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35672-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer - namely, a lot of attention - which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3839en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordManager-employee relationshipsen
dc.subject.keywordwagesen
dc.subject.keywordextra-role behavioren
dc.subject.keywordsabotageen
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordsocial exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordconditional altruismen
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordsignaling gameen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwAngestellteen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGift exchange in the workplace: money or attention?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn586011722en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.