Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35612 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4071
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the nearly retired unemployed workers rationally expect never to suffer from the punishment. This is why imposing a tax on the future job is particularly efficient in the context of older workers because the agency can now reward the job search by present employment subsidies. Moreover, we propose adopting a global approach to unemployment insurance by determining an optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment insurance
retirement
recursive contracts
moral hazard
JEL: 
C61
J64
J65
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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