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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4214
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby improve children's welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child labor.
Schlagwörter: 
Child labor
political economy
international labor standards
trade sanctions
JEL: 
J20
J88
O10
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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