Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470 
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dc.contributor.authorMarchesi, Silviaen
dc.contributor.authorSabani, Lauraen
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:15Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009032389en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470-
dc.description.abstractWe focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4041en
dc.subject.jelC23en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelN2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMF conditionalityen
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen
dc.subject.keywordpanel dataen
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleAgency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn595037550en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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