Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35405
Authors: 
Reuben, Ernesto
Suetens, Sigrid
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 4107
Abstract: 
We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.
Subjects: 
Reputation building
strong reciprocity
conditional cooperation
strategic cooperation
JEL: 
C91
D01
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
259.32 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.