Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35322 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4196
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may outsource part of the production process abroad, and where outsourcing is substitutable for domestic low-ability labor. Our results show that the incentives for the government to relax the self-selection constraint and to increase the employment among the low-skilled reinforce each other in terms of marginal income taxation; both of them contribute to increase the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type. The appearance of equilibrium unemployment also constitutes an incentive to implement a tax on outsourcing. Without a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the government may reduce the amount of resources spent on outsourcing by increased provision of the public input good, which leads to less wage inequality and increased employment.
Schlagwörter: 
Outsourcing
optimal nonlinear taxation
public goods
unemployment
JEL: 
H21
H25
J31
J62
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
223.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.