Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310
Autor:innen: 
Harbring, Christine
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4205
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name 'sabotage'. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output.
Schlagwörter: 
Sabotage
tournament
reciprocity
relative performance scheme
experiment
JEL: 
M52
J33
J41
L23
C72
C91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
333.79 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.