Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35298 
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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen
dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:50:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:50:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090119104en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35298-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3914en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordcontribution preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordleadershipen
dc.subject.keywordleading-by-exampleen
dc.subject.keywordfalse consensus effecten
dc.subject.stwFührungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleWho makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-example-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn589772333en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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