Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35276 
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dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Indraneelen
dc.contributor.authorMaitra, Pushkaren
dc.contributor.authorMukherjee, Digantaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-08-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:40Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35276-
dc.description.abstractWe model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated brides, some parents can prevent costly household partition. Paternalistic self-interest consequently generates low levels of female schooling in the steady state equilibrium. State payments to parents for educating daughters fail to raise female schooling levels. Policies (such as housing subsidies) that promote nuclear families, interventions against early marriages, and state support to couples who marry against parental wishes, are however all likely to improve female schooling. We offer evidence from India consistent with our theoretical analysis.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3336en
dc.subject.jelD10en
dc.subject.ddc300en
dc.subject.keywordArranged marriageen
dc.subject.keyworddowryen
dc.subject.keywordbride priceen
dc.subject.keywordfemale literacyen
dc.subject.keywordmarriage marketsen
dc.subject.keywordstable marriage allocationen
dc.subject.stwFrauenbildungen
dc.subject.stwEheen
dc.subject.stwElternen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwWohnsoziologieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwIndienen
dc.titleArranged' marriage, co-residence and female schooling: a model with evidence from India-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559866933en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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