Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35244
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dc.contributor.authorArulampalam, Wijien_US
dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Sugatoen_US
dc.contributor.authorDhillon, Amritaen_US
dc.contributor.authorDutta, Bhaskaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:17Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35244-
dc.description.abstractWe construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3376en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRedistributive politicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordalignmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordswingen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwIndienen_US
dc.titleElectoral goals and center-state transfers: a theoretical model and empirical evidence from Indiaen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn560201540en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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