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dc.contributor.authorBraun, Sebastianen
dc.contributor.authorDwenger, Nadjaen
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:34:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:34:58Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35217-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (Abiturbestenverfahren, Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen) and on waiting time (Wartezeitverfahren). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3261en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc370en
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen
dc.subject.keyworduniversity admissionsen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic behaviouren
dc.subject.stwStudienfachen
dc.subject.stwBerufswahlen
dc.subject.stwZentrale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleTelling the truth may not pay off: an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn561343616en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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