Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35192 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3327
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We model individual careers in sports and games from initial entry to eventual exit or success as a discrete-choice, finite-horizon optimization problem. We apply this model to the international game of chess and study cross-country differences in the relative success of players. While we find no evidence that the players in our sample from the ex-Warsaw Pact are more talented than European and American players, there is evidence that they face lower training costs.
Subjects: 
Occupational choice
sports and games
JEL: 
J24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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