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dc.contributor.authorBrown, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorFalk, Arminen
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35139-
dc.description.abstractWhen unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements - or relational contracts - also motivate high worker performance when the labor market is tight? We examine this question by implementing an experimental market in which there is an excess demand for labor and the performance of workers is not third-party enforceable. We show that relational contracts emerge in which firms reward performing workers with wages that exceed the going market rate. This motivates workers to provide high effort, even though they could shirk and switch firms. Our results thus suggest that unemployment is not a necessary device to motivate workers. We also discuss how market conditions affect relational contracting by comparing identical labor markets with excess supply and excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor compared to a market characterized by unemployment. Surprisingly though, this does not compromise market performance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3345en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRelational contractsen
dc.subject.keywordinvoluntary unemploymenten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwImplizite Kontrakteen
dc.subject.stwUnfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetition and relational contracts: the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn560201354en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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