Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35050
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dc.contributor.authorvan der Wiel, Karenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:32:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:32:59Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35050-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically establishes the effect of the employer's term of notice on the wage level of employees. The term of notice is defined as the period an employer has to notify workers in advance of their up-coming dismissal. The wages paid during this period are an important element of firing costs and hence employment protection. To find a causal effect, I exploit the exogenous change in the term of notice that resulted from the introduction of a new Dutch law in 1999. Strong evidence is found that a longer 'dormant' term of notice leads to higher wages. In my sample, an additional month of notice increases wages by three percent, ceteris paribus.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3352en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEmployment protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordwagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfixed effectsen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwReformen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnen_US
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen_US
dc.titleBetter protected, better paid: evidence on how employment protection affects wagesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn560201230en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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