Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35041 
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dc.contributor.authorBrañas-Garza, Pabloen
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Muñoz, Teresaen
dc.contributor.authorNeuman, Shoshanaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:32:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:32:53Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35041-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3287en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCarrot/sticken
dc.subject.keywordhigh stakesen
dc.subject.keywordrewardsen
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten
dc.subject.keywordeconomics of religionen
dc.subject.stwReligionen
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwKirchenpolitiken
dc.titleThe big carrot: high stake incentives revisited-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn55986681Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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