Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35041
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dc.contributor.authorBrañas-Garza, Pabloen_US
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Muñoz, Teresaen_US
dc.contributor.authorNeuman, Shoshanaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:32:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:32:53Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35041-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3287en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc200en_US
dc.subject.keywordCarrot/sticken_US
dc.subject.keywordhigh stakesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrewardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomics of religionen_US
dc.subject.stwReligionen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwKirchenpolitiken_US
dc.titleThe big carrot: high stake incentives revisiteden_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn55986681Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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