Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35009 
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dc.contributor.authorGrund, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorPrzemeck, Judithen
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:31:26Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:31:26Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35009-
dc.description.abstractMany firms use subjective performance appraisal systems due to lack of objective performance measures. In these cases, supervisors usually have to rate the performance of their subordinates. Using such systems, it is a well established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences for the utility of her inequality averse subordinates, and discuss determinants of the size of the biases. Extensions of the basic model include the role of supervisor's favoritism of one particular agent and the endogenous effort choice of agents. Whether inequality averse agents exert higher efforts then purely self-oriented ones, depends on the size of effort costs and inequality aversion.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3382en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordappraisalsen
dc.subject.keywordinequality aversionen
dc.subject.keywordperformance evaluationen
dc.subject.keywordcentrality biasen
dc.subject.keywordleniency biasen
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeurteilungen
dc.subject.stwCoachingen
dc.subject.stwBiasen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSubjective performance evaluation and inequality aversion-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn560456727en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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