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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3424
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
Trust
incentives
experiments
tournaments
JEL: 
J31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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