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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gagliarducci, Stefano | en |
dc.contributor.author | Nannicini, Tommaso | en |
dc.contributor.author | Naticchioni, Paolo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-08-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T11:29:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T11:29:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34826 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians' rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x3348 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C20 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 320 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Electoral rule | en |
dc.subject.keyword | politicians | en |
dc.subject.keyword | targeted redistribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rent-seeking | en |
dc.subject.keyword | regression discontinuity design | en |
dc.subject.keyword | treatment effect | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politiker | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlsystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regionalpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlkreis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rent Seeking | en |
dc.subject.stw | Italien | en |
dc.title | Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: a micro test | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 559866968 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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