Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34808 
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dc.contributor.authorGrodner, Andrewen
dc.contributor.authorKniesner, Thomas J.en
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:29:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:29:35Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008100821en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34808-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the socially optimal wealth distribution in a two-person two-good model with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric social interactions where only one (social) individual derives positive or negative utility from the leisure of the other (non-social) individual. We show that the interdependence can effectively counter-act the need to transfer wealth to low-wage individuals and may require them to be poorer by all objective measures. We demonstrate that in the presence of social interactions it can be socially desirable to keep substantial wealth inequality.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3684en
dc.subject.jelD31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWealth inequalityen
dc.subject.keywordearnings inequalityen
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionsen
dc.subject.stwVermögensverteilungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDistribution of wealth and interdependent preferences-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn578594064en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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