Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34597
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Harbring, Christine
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3111
Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.
Subjects: 
Tournament
commitment problems
feedback
experiment
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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