Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34582 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3077
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may well reduce effort and hence the probability of success. I also identify conditions under which the income effect dominates the incentive effect, and single out the hazard-rate of effort as a crucial determinant of this trade-off.
Schlagwörter: 
Bonus
premium
incentives
income effect
moral hazard
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
114.39 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.