Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34500 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3127
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We set out a general framework for cooperative household models, based on Samuelson's idea of a household welfare function, but extending it to incorporate the key insight from Nash bargaining models - the idea that the household's preference ordering over the utility profiles of its members depends on their wage rates (or prices more generally) and non-wage incomes. Applying reasonable general restrictions on the effects of changes in these variables allows derivation of the general implications of cooperative models.
Schlagwörter: 
Generalisation
household
model
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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