Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34470
Authors: 
Bellemare, Charles
Kröger, Sabine
van Soest, Arthur
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3022
Abstract: 
We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player's disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.
Subjects: 
Inequity aversion
intentions
subjective expectations
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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