Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34466 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3026
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Firms hiring fresh graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Intuitively, one expects starting wages to reflect this. Formal analysis supports the intuition. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education as an indicator of the heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower if the variance of exam grades is higher and that starting wages are lower if the skew is higher: employers shift quality risk to new hires, but pay for the opportunity to catch the really good workers.
Schlagwörter: 
Wages
risk
ability
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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