Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice

Meisner, Vincent; Süer, Müge; Tolksdorf, Michel; Tominaj, Sokol

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/343787

Title:

Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice

Authors:

Meisner, Vincent
Süer, Müge
Tolksdorf, Michel
Tominaj, Sokol

Year of Publication:

2026

Series/Report no.:

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2026: Behavioral Economics

Publisher:

ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg

Abstract:

This is a school-choice experiment in which students' beliefs are manipulated using a hard-easy gap. We test how information provision changes allocations in a (strategy-proof!) serial-dictatorship mechanism. It does quite a lot.

JEL:

C92
D47

Document Type:

Conference Paper

Appears in Collections:

Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2026: Behavioral Economics

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