Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/343078 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 491
Publisher: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Does uncertainty created by the risk of sanctions affect trade above and beyond the sanctions actually imposed? While most restrictions on Russian imports were introduced immediately after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the sanctioning countries simultaneously pledged further escalation unless the conflict ended. In line with this threat, we estimate that the subsequent escalations were largely anticipated in advance, with trade flows declining many months before they actually became subject to sanctions. Crucially, this effect was not limited just to sanctioned trade flows: we also estimate a decline for a wide range of never-sanctioned trade flows that nonetheless could have been perceived as being at risk of future sanctions. Overall, our results imply that Russia lost the equivalent of about a month and a half of imports over 2022-23 due to the escalation of sanctions after April 2022, with two-thirds of this loss driven by reductions in never-sanctioned trade flows that were only at risk of sanctions.
Subjects: 
sanctions
international trade
Russia-Ukraine war
geoeconomics
uncertainty
JEL: 
D22
D74
F14
F51
H56
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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