Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/342692 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We study the fiscal and educational consequences of franchise extension using the administratively arbitrary sorting of Dutch municipalities into nine voter-eligibility classes by the 1896 Electoral Law. Larger suffrage expansions contracted municipal expenditure and revenue and cut education spending, the largest budget heading. Public-school fees fell sharply while public pupils, schools, and class size did not change, so a smaller budget was spread over unchanged public provision and the saving passed to parents. Administrative records for 1905--1907 show that private pupil and teacher stocks expanded and the private share of teaching staff rose, while public stocks stood still inside a growing system. Neither a rise in the appeal of confessional schooling nor a fall in public teachers per pupil accounts for this. Teacher vacancy advertisements show private schools raising salaries while public councils increasingly rested on the statutory minimum. Democratization reorganized primary education rather than enlarging or shrinking it.
Subjects: 
democratization
political economy
education
public goods
public economics
JEL: 
N43
H75
I22
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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