Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34266 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 2804
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper studies the effects of different income transfers on individual welfare, in both marriage and divorce situations, and on family decisions. We assume three generations within the family. We develop a sequential game that, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer within a relationship of one-sided altruism. In the second stage, the level of welfare is deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution. We show that inter-generational transfers may produce losses derived from the marriage. We have also found that the donor of an intergenerational transfer can behave in a compensatory way in an altruism model.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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