Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/342599 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 23-41
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 23-58
Version Description: 
Revised Version for the Journal of Legal Studies
Publisher: 
SSRN, Rochester, NY
Abstract: 
Recent lab and field experiments have provided evidence of a positive voting effect: cooperation in social dilemmas appears to be stronger when policies are chosen by vote instead of being imposed. It remains less clear what drives this so-called "democracy premium" and whether the effect is universal. While some studies suggest that selecting cooperation-friendly rules signals cooperativeness, others suggest the effect may be limited to those who won the vote and feel committed to it. Our study identifies a different mechanism for the democracy premium: we find that the mere entitlement to voting rights enhances cooperation in a public goods game. Moreover, participating in the voting process increased individuals' cooperativeness regardless of whether their preferred rules prevailed. We also show that this democracy premium is not universal. We conducted the study in two countries at opposite ends of the democracy spectrum: Germany and China. While the German evidence supported the democracy premium across two separate laboratories, the premium was, as hypothesized, significantly smaller in our Chinese data. In both Chinese laboratories, we observed no voting benefits at all-with contributions being, if anything, lower when rules were chosen democratically.
Subjects: 
Democracy Premium
Cooperation and Norm Compliance
Public Good Provision
Voting Behavior
Cross-Country-Comparison
JEL: 
D72
H41
C91
D02
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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