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dc.contributor.authorBarth, Erlingen_US
dc.contributor.authorBratsberg, Bernten_US
dc.contributor.authorHægeland, Torbjørnen_US
dc.contributor.authorRaaum, Oddbjørnen_US
dc.description.abstractUsing Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems. Performance-related pay is also more widespread in large firms. Traditionally, wage setting in the Norwegian labor market has been dominated by negotiations between trade unions and employer associations at the central and local levels, with a fixed hourly wage as a predominant element of the wage scheme. Our results show that performance-related pay is less common in highly unionized firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralized bargaining. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper reveals that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, we find that the incidence of performance-related pay relates positively to product-market competition and foreign ownership.en_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2142en_US
dc.subject.keywordperformance related payen_US
dc.subject.keywordagency problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompensation methodsen_US
dc.titleWho pays for performance?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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