Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/341903 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Citation: 
[Journal:] Group Decision and Negotiation [ISSN:] 1572-9907 [Volume:] 35 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 34 [Publisher:] Springer Netherlands [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2026
Publisher: 
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht
Abstract: 
Research on negotiation ethics has often interpreted ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANT) as the result of deliberate cost-benefit reasoning aimed at maximizing negotiators’ advantage. However, behavioral ethics research suggests that unethical behavior may also arise from nonrational processes. This study examines the role of such processes in the application of EANT. Drawing on survey data from 495 experienced practitioners, we combine the established SINS II scale with a newly developed measure capturing situational decision drivers associated with the use of ethically ambiguous tactics. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses reveal a three-factor structure reflecting a continuum of decision drivers: a rational endpoint characterized by deliberate cost-benefit considerations, a nonrational endpoint associated with emotional and reactive processes, and an intermediate region shaped by behavioral norms and social pressure. The results suggest that nonrational drivers are meaningfully associated with the application of EANT and that different groups of tactics appear to be linked to distinct constellations of decision drivers. While the measurement remains exploratory, the findings suggest that unethical negotiation behavior cannot be fully explained through rational cost-benefit reasoning alone. Instead, ethical decision-making in negotiations appears to emerge from interacting cognitive processes and situational dynamics.
Subjects: 
SINS II scale
Negotiation ethics
Behavioral ethics
Bounded rationality
Dual process theory
Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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