Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33906 
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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Johnen
dc.contributor.authorEstrin, Saulen
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-05-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33906-
dc.description.abstractWe address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the non-internalization, under decentralization, of the 'bribe externality' and the 'price externality.' In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2156en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordbureaucratic structureen
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping economyen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwBürokratieen
dc.subject.stwPrivatisierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCorruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economy-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn513214216en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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