Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33906
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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorEstrin, Saulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33906-
dc.description.abstractWe address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the non-internalization, under decentralization, of the 'bribe externality' and the 'price externality.' In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2156en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbureaucratic structureen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping economyen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwBürokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivatisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCorruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn513214216en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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