Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33898
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dc.contributor.authorBrunello, Giorgioen_US
dc.contributor.authorComi, Simonaen_US
dc.contributor.authorSonedda, Danielaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:52:18Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:52:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33898-
dc.description.abstractAccording to the standard principal-agent model, the optimal composition of pay should balance the provision of incentives with the individual demand for insurance. Do income taxes alter this balance? We show that the relative share of PRP on total pay is reduced by higher average taxes, and is affected in a complex way by higher marginal tax rates. Empirical evidence based on the British Household Panel Survey, which exploits the UK 1999 Tax Reform, supports the theoretical predictions of the tax-augmented principal-agent model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2203en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelH24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordperformance related payen_US
dc.subject.keywordincome taxesen_US
dc.titleIncome taxes and the composition of payen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn514747021en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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