Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33898 
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dc.contributor.authorBrunello, Giorgioen
dc.contributor.authorComi, Simonaen
dc.contributor.authorSonedda, Danielaen
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:52:18Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:52:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33898-
dc.description.abstractAccording to the standard principal-agent model, the optimal composition of pay should balance the provision of incentives with the individual demand for insurance. Do income taxes alter this balance? We show that the relative share of PRP on total pay is reduced by higher average taxes, and is affected in a complex way by higher marginal tax rates. Empirical evidence based on the British Household Panel Survey, which exploits the UK 1999 Tax Reform, supports the theoretical predictions of the tax-augmented principal-agent model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2203en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelH24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordperformance related payen
dc.subject.keywordincome taxesen
dc.titleIncome taxes and the composition of pay-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn514747021en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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