Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338279 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10969
Version Description: 
This Version: October 2025
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
This paper examines the influence of political leaders' spouses on resource allocation and regional development. We construct two new global datasets: one tracking leaders' and spouses' characteristics and one that geocodes aid projects, including new data from the United States and 18 European donors. For 1990-2020, we find that Western bilateral donors direct significantly more aid to spouses' birth regions during their partners' tenure, while leader birth regions do not experience comparable favoritism, consistent with donors' efforts to avoid the appearance of political bias. Spousal favoritism is best explained by recipient-driven informal influence, particularly around elections, rather than systematic spouse selection, career preparation, settlement motives, or strategic donor behavior. Aid inflows to spouses' birth regions are less effective, turning favoritism into a liability for local development. Our findings suggest that even in closely monitored areas, such as foreign aid, political favoritism takes less visible channels, raising questions about accountability and effectiveness.
Subjects: 
favoritism
informal influence
birth regions
development finance
foreign aid
official development assistance
political connections
geoeconomics
JEL: 
D72
F35
O19
O47
P33
R11
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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