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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] German Economic Review (GER) [ISSN:] 1468-0475 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 315-360
Verlag: 
De Gruyter, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper takes the canonical Burdett-Mortensen model of wage-posting and relaxes the assumption that wages are set once-for-all, instead assuming they can only be committed one period at a time. It derives a closed-form solution for a steady-state Markov Rank-Preserving Equilibrium and shows how this relates to the canonical model and performs some comparative statics on it. But it is shown that a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium may fail to exist because employers have more monopsony power over existing workers than new recruits and that this non-existence can be a problem for plausible parameter values. It is shown how a Rank-Inverting Equilibrium may exist. It is argued that this problem is likely to occur in a wide range of search models.
Schlagwörter: 
monopsony
search
wage-posting
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