Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337217 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: Seonmul yeon'gu (JDQS) [ISSN:] 2713-6647 [Volume:] 28 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 123-140
Publisher: 
Emerald, Leeds
Abstract: 
This paper aims to show that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the post-M&A performance-time until deal completion nexus. The findings are that the due diligence hypothesis and the overdue hypothesis proposed and tested in Thompson and Kim (2020) are influenced by the information asymmetry of the target during the negotiation process. Thus, mergers that involve more opaque targets that take a shorter time to close perform better, whereas those that take too long to close experience poor post-M&A performance. Conversely, there is no such effect when the mergers involve targets that are transparent and not plagued with large information asymmetry problems. These results hold for the short-term supporting the evidence that information asymmetry problems are severe before the merger is consummated and become attenuated post-merger.
Subjects: 
Information asymmetry
M&A performance
Due diligence hypothesis
Overdue hypothesis
Time until deal completion
JEL: 
G34
G14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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