Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33700
Authors: 
Habermalz, Steffen
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 2309
Abstract: 
This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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