Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336865 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economic Surveys [ISSN:] 1467-6419 [Volume:] 40 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 505-527
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This review article examines the challenge of eliciting truthful information from multiple individuals when such information cannot be verified, a problem known as “information elicitation without verification.” This article reviews over 25 mechanisms designed to incentivize truth‐telling in such scenarios and their effectiveness in empirical studies. Although many mechanisms theoretically ensure truthfulness as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, empirical evidence regarding the effects of mechanisms on truth‐telling is limited and generally weak. Consequently, more empirical research is needed to validate mechanisms. However, empirical validation is difficult because most mechanisms are very complex and cannot be easily conveyed to research subjects. This review suggests that simple and intuitive mechanisms may be easier to empirically test and apply.
Subjects: 
belief elicitation
comprehension
incentives
Peer Prediction
truth serum
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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