Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336552 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 502
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by symmetry, ex-post efficiency and probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.
Schlagwörter: 
Random Assignment
Random Priority
Random Serial Dictatorship
Ex-Post Efficiency
Probabilistic Monotonicity
Maskin Monotonicity
JEL: 
C70
C78
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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