Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33635
Authors: 
Gautier, Pieter A.
Wolthoff, Ronald P.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 2056
Abstract: 
We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and both to the low productivity sector. Efficiency requires however that they apply to both sectors because then the coordination frictions are lowest. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search. Allowing for free entry creates a second source of inefficiency.
Subjects: 
directed search
efficiency
coordination frictions
JEL: 
D83
E24
J23
J24
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.