Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33571
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33571-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I consider the desirability of drugs that enhance cognitive abilities in the context of tournaments that are used as optimal labor contracts as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Such drugs reduce the number of voluntary participants in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if drugs are available and used.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1844en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcognitive enhancement drugsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor market incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddopingen_US
dc.subject.keywordentry in tournamentsen_US
dc.titleTournaments and multiple productive inputs: the case of performance enhancing drugsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn508541247en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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